Most retirees take payouts from their defined contribution pensions as lump sums, but the US Treasury recently moved to encourage firms and individuals to convert some of the $15 trillion in plan balances into longevity income annuities paying lifetime benefits from age 85 onward. We evaluate the welfare implications of this reform using a calibrated lifecycle consumption and portfolio choice model embodying realistic institutional considerations. We show that defaulting a fixed fraction of workers' 401(k) assets over a dollar threshold is a cost-effective and appealing way to enhance retirement security, enhancing welfare by up to 20% of retiree plan accruals.
Introduction
Much has been written on the theoretical economic appeal of annuities as important financial instruments to which private households should allocate their retirement assets, but in practice, few people purchase them (c.f., Benartzi et al., 2011; Davidoff et al., 2005; Inkmann et al., 2011 and originally Yaari 1965) . Prior explanations of this phenomenon, which is often referred to as the "annuity puzzle," have pointed to factors such as costs/loadings, retiree bequest motives, liquidity needs, and behavioral reasons including product complexity. 1 Yet one important explanation hitherto not examined pertains to a key institutional rule discouraging annuitization in employer-based 401(k) defined contribution plans, the standard tax-qualified mechanism in which private sector workers save for retirement in the U.S. and now worth $15 trillion (ICI 2016) . Specifically, until 2014, US tax rules required retirees to withdraw from their retirement accounts following the so-called "Required Minimum Distribution" (RMD) rule each year from age 70.5 onward. The RMD was computed such that the sum of annual payouts was expected to exhaust the retiree's 401(k) balance by the end of his life (IRS 2012b) . Even if a retiree did buy an annuity with plan assets, the RMD was still calculated taking into account the value of his annuity. This had the unappealing consequence that the retiree might find himself needing to withdraw an amount in excess of his liquid assets (excluding the annuity value) and be forced to pay a 50% excise tax (Iwry 2014) . Moreover, on the supply side, in this regulatory regime plan sponsors took on a significant fiduciary risk if they were to encourage financially-inexperienced workers to convert some of their accumulated 401(k) assets into life annuities requiring large RMD payouts. As a result, it is not surprising that few 401(k) retirement plans in the U.S. offered access to lifelong income payments helping retirees cover the decumulation or drawdown phase of the lifecycle. 2 This paper contributes to the literature by evaluating how a recent change in regulatory policy by the U.S. Department of the Treasury corrects this institutional bias by providing "more options for putting the pension back" into private sector defined contribution plans (Iwry 2014) . Specifically, the Treasury amended the required minimum distribution regulations for 401(k) plan (and also for non-profit firms' 403(b) plans as well as Individual Retirement Accounts or IRAs) "to provide a measure of additional flexibility consistent with the statutory RMD provisions" (Iwry 2014) . 3 The eligible instruments must be deferred annuities, also referred to as longevity income annuities (LIAs) , that begin payouts not later than age 85 and cost less than 25% of the retiree's account balance (up to a limit). 4 Under these conditions, the retiree's annuity is no longer counted in determining his RMD. The policy change therefore relaxes the RMD requirements that had effectively precluded the offering of longevity annuities in the 401(k) contexts.
As we show below, this reform makes annuitization far more appealing for plan sponsors and for households making retirement portfolio allocation decisions. Such instruments provide a low-cost way to hedge the risk of outliving one's assets, which is a key risk facing older people unable to return to work and confronting high healthcare costs. For example, the expected remaining lifetime for a 65-year-old US female is about 21 years (using general population statistics; Arias 2016 ). Yet there is substantial variabilityabout nine yearsaround 2 Benartzi et al. (2011) note that only about one-fifth of U.S. defined contribution plans currently offer annuities as a payout option; a small survey of 22 plan record-keepers by the US GAO (2016) concluded that few plans currently offer participants ways to "help them secure lifetime income in retirement." Most innovation in the DC arena over the last decade has instead focused on the accumulation phase, with the introduction of products to attract saving including life cycle or target date funds and the widespread adoption of automatic 401(k) enrollment and automatic escalation of contributions (c.f. Gomes et al. 2008; Poterba et al. 2007) . Some countries including Germany require retirees to convert a part of their accumulated tax-qualified retirement assets into a longevity annuity beginning at age 85 (see Horneff et al. 2014) . 3 Treasury had originally proposed these amendments to the regulations two years earlier, referring to the new longevity annuities as "qualifying longevity annuity contracts" (or "QLACS"; see US Department of the Treasury 2014). 4 As suggested by Gale et al. (2008). this mean, implying that individuals' uncertainty about the length of their lifetimes can restrain retirement consumption and reduce lifetime well-being. Even in the current low interest rate environment, a deferred single life annuity purchased at age 65 by a man (woman) costing $10,000 provides an annual benefit flow from age 85 onward of $4,830 ($3,866) per year for life. 5 This results from the investment returns earned over the 20 years prior to the withdrawal start date, plus the accumulated survival credits resulting from premiums paid by those who die earlier than expected being shared with those who survive in the annuitant pool.
In what follows, we build a realistic lifecycle model that matches data on 401(k) balances, which we use to quantify the potential impact of this new policy for a range of retiree types differentiated by sex, educational level, and preferences. Most importantly, and distinct from prior research, we do so while accounting for real-world income tax rules, Social Security contribution and benefit rules, and the Required Minimum Distribution (RMD) regulations.
This model is then used to determine how much participants would optimally elect to annuitize given the opportunity to do so under the new RMD rules, when they face income, spending, and capital market shocks, and where they are also subject to uncertainty about their lifespans.
In this realistic setting, we evaluate how much better off participants would be if their options included LIAs in the payout menu, versus without access to them. We also investigate how such products could be implemented as a default solution analogous to how Target Date Funds (TDFs) have been adopted during the accumulation phase. 6 Specifically, we measure the potential improvements in well-being if a plan sponsor were to default a certain percentage of retirees' assets (over a certain threshold) into a deferred annuity, taking into account mortality heterogeneity by education and sex. 7 5 Quotes available August 2016 on https://www.immediateannuities.com/ 6 The 2006 Pension Protection Act allowed plan sponsors to offer Target Date Funds as qualified default investment alternatives in participant-directed individual account plans (US DOL nd). A 2014 Treasury/IRS Administrative Guidance letter (IRS 2014) made clear that annuitiesincluding deferred income annuitiescould be a 401(k) default option. 7 For instance Iwry (2014) discussed a case where the retiree could convert 15% of his plan assets into a deferred annuity. Iwry and Turner (2009) explored two approaches to make deferred income annuities the default payout To preview our findings, we show that introducing a longevity income annuity would be quite attractive for most DC plan participants. Specifically, older individuals would optimally commit 8-15% of their plan balances at age 65 to a LIA which began paying out at age 85. When participants can select their own optimal annuitization rates, welfare increases by 5-20% of average retirement plan accruals as of age 66 (assuming average mortality rates), compared to not having access to LIAs. If, instead, plan sponsors were to default participants into deferred annuities using 10% of their plan assets, this would reduce retiree wellbeing only slightly compared to the optimum. Not surprisingly, results are less positive for those with substantially higher mortality vis a vis population averages: for such individuals, using a fixed percentage default rule generates lower welfare since annuity prices based on average mortality rates are too high. Converting retirement assets into a longevity annuity only for those having at least $65,000 in their retirement accounts overcomes this problem. Accordingly, we conclude that including well-designed LIA defaults in DC plans yields quite positive consequences for 401(k)-covered workers. 8
Our research connects to and extends several strands of the literature on lifecycle consumption and portfolio choice initiated by Merton (1969) . Various authors have extended these models by incorporating new sources of uncertainty (e.g., labor income risk, interest rate risk, mortality risk, or health risk), or nonfinancial assets such as housing, life insurance, and annuities. 9 Yet little research to date has focused on how the institutional environments shape lifecycle financial decision making, especially key tax rules and requirements regarding retirement asset distribution. Love (2007) and Gomes et al. (2009) included tax-deferred 401(k) retirement accounts in a lifecycle model to study the impact of these on workers' participation approach in 401(k) plans. A US Department of Labor letter to Mark Iwry (US DOL 2014) explicitly permitted plan sponsors to include annuity contracts as fixed income investments in a 401(k) plan. 8 Moreover, our findings also apply to 403(b) and Individual Retirement Account payouts, since the RMD rules for these accounts are similar to those for 401(k) plans. 9 See for instance Cocco (2005) in the stock market. We extend that framework by incorporating crucially important additional features of taxation including progressive federal income taxes, Medicare taxes, Social Security taxes, and RMD rules regarding 401(k) withdrawals. We also include a realistic representation of Social Security benefits which depend on lifetime earnings, and we include the opportunity to buy a longevity income annuity at retirement. The careful incorporation of such institutional features in lifecycle model is of key importance in evaluating the impact of the policy reform.
In what follows, we describe our life cycle model and explain how we use it to study optimal consumption, investment, and annuitization decisions. In addition, we report the welfare implications of gaining access to in-plan LIAs. Sensitivity analyses illustrate how results vary across a range of parameters including uninsurable labor income profiles, sex, mortality assumptions, and preferences. Next, we discuss the impact of alternative default rules for retirement asset annuitization. A final section concludes.
Deferred longevity income annuities in a life cycle model: Methodology
Our discrete time dynamic portfolio and consumption model posits an individual who decides over his life cycle how much to consume optimally and how much to invest in stocks, bonds, and annuities. We model utility as depending on consumption and bequests, while constraints include a realistic characterization of income profiles, taxes, and the opportunity to invest in a 401(k)-type tax-qualified retirement plan (up to a limit). At retirement (assumed here to be age 66), the individual determines how much of his retirement account he wishes to convert to a deferred longevity income annuity, with the remainder held in liquid stocks and bonds. We also take into account the Required Minimum Distribution rules relevant to the US 401(k) setting, as well as a realistic formulation of Social Security benefits. In a subsequent section, we provide additional robustness analysis on different preferences and mortality heterogeneity across educational categories.
a.Preferences.
We build a discrete-time dynamic consumption and portfolio choice model for utilitymaximizing investors over the life cycle. The individual's decision period starts at = 1 (age of 25) and ends at = 76 (age 100); accordingly, each period corresponds to a year. The individual's subjective probability of survival from time until + 1 is denoted by s t p .
Preferences at time t are specified by a time-separable CRRA utility function defined over current consumption, . The parameter represents the coefficient of relative risk aversion and β is the time preference rate. Then the recursive definition of the corresponding value function is given by:
where terminal utility is =
). The parameter measures the strength of the bequest motive , i.e. the utility from leaving financial wealth to the next generation in case the individual have died. In our base case we set the parameter = 0, while in sensitivity analysis we allow it to be positive.
b. The Budget Constraint during the Work Life.
While working, the individual has the opportunity to invest a part ( ) of his uncertain pre-tax salary (to an annual limit of $18,000) 10 in a tax-qualified retirement plan held in stocks and bonds :
Here is cash on hand after tax, denotes consumption, and , , , ≥ 0 . One year later, his cash on hand is given by the value of his stocks having earned an uncertain gross return , bonds having earned riskless return of , labor income +1 reduced by housing costs 10 The $18,000 limit was the legal limit on tax-deferred contributions to 401(k) plans in 2016, and if permitted by the plan, employees age 50+ can make additional 401(k) catch-up contributions of $6,000 per year.
ℎ modeled as a percentage of labor income (as in Love 2010), and withdrawals ( ) from his 401(k) plan: 11
During his work life, the individual also pays taxes, which reduce cash on hand available for consumption and investment. 12 First, labor income is reduced by 11.65% ( ), which is the sum of the Medicare (1.45%), city/state (4%), and Social Security (6.2%) taxes. In addition, the worker also must pay income taxes ( +1 ) according to US federal progressive tax system rules (IRS 2012b).
The individual may save in a tax-qualified 401(k) plan only during the working period, while non-pension saving in bonds and stocks is allowed over the entire life cycle. The exogenously-determined labor income process is +1 = ( ) · +1 · +1 with a deterministic trend ( ), permanent income component +1 = · +1 and transitory shock +1 .
Prior to retirement, his retirement plan assets are invested in bonds which earn the riskfree pre-tax return ( ), and risky stocks paying an uncertain pre-tax return ( ). The total value ( +1 ) of his 401(k) assets at time + 1 is therefore determined by his previous period's value, minus any withdrawals ( ≤ ), plus additional contributions ( ), and returns from stocks and bonds:
His retirement plan assets are invested in a Target Date Fund with a relative stock exposure that declines according to age following the popular "Age -100" rule ( = (100 − )/100 ). 13
The year before he retires at age 65 ( − 1), the individual determines how much of his 401(k) assets ( K−1 ) he will switch to a deferred longevity income annuity with income benefits starting at age 85. Accordingly, the LIA income stream ( ) is determined as follows:
where ̈= ∏ +20
is the annuity factor transforming his lump sum into a payment stream from age 85. The amount used to buy the LIA reduces the value of his 401(k) assets invested in stocks and bonds, so the subsequent 401(k) payments are as follows:
c. The Budget Constraint in Retirement.
During retirement, the individual saves in stocks and bonds and consumes what remains:
Cash on hand for the next period evolves as follows:
where the LIA pays constant lifelong benefits ( ) from age 85 ( ) onwards. At retirement, the worker has access to Social Security benefits determined by his Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) which is a function of his average lifetime (35 best years of) earnings. 14 His Social Security payments ( +1 ) in retirement ( ≥ ) are given by:
where is a lognormally-distributed transitory shock ln( )~N(−0.5 ℇ 2 , ℇ 2 ) with a mean of one which reflects out-of-pocket medical and other expenditure shocks (as in Love 2010). 15 According to the new US Treasury rules, the present value of the LIA is excluded when determining the retiree's RMD. However, LIA benefit payments from age 85 onward are subject to income taxes. During retirement, Social Security benefits are taxed (up to certain limits) 16 at the individual federal income tax rate as well as the city/state/Medicare tax rate.
Payouts from the 401(k) plan are given by:
Moreover, the RMD rules require that 401(k) participants take a minimum withdrawal from their plans from age 70.5 onwards, defined as a specified age-dependent percentage ( ) of plan assets, or else they must pay a substantial tax penalty. Accordingly, to avoid the excise penalty, plan payouts are set so ≤ < .
Model calibration
Survival rates entering into the utility function are taken from the US Population Life by the Society of Actuaries (SOA nd). Annuity survival rates are higher than those for the general population because they take into account adverse selection among annuity purchasers. 17 Social Security old age benefits are based on the 35 best years of income and the bend points as of 2013 (US SSA nd). Accordingly, the annual Primary Insurance Amounts (or the unreduced Social Security benefits) equal 90 percent of (12 times) the first $791 of average indexed monthly earnings, plus 32 percent of average indexed monthly earnings over $791 and 15 The transitory variances assumed are ℇ 2 = 0.0784 for high school and less than high school graduates, and ℇ 2 = 0.0767 for college graduates (as in Love 2010). 16 For detail on how we treat Social Security benefit taxation see Appendix B. Due to quite generous allowances, not many individuals pay income taxes on their Social Security benefits. 17 The implied loads using the annuity table are about 15-20%; see Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) through $4,768, plus 15 percent of average indexed monthly earnings over $4,768. 18 Required Minimum Distributions from 401(k) plans are based on life expectancy using the IRS Uniform Lifetime Table (IRS 2012b) . In line with US rules, federal income taxes are calculated based on the household's taxable income, six income tax brackets, and the corresponding marginal tax rates for each tax bracket (for details see Appendix B).
Our financial market parameterizations include a risk-free interest rate of 1% and an equity risk premium of 4% with a return volatility of 18%. The labor income process during the work life has both a permanent and transitory component, with uncorrelated and normally distributed shocks as ln(N t )~N(−0.5σ n 2 , σ n 2 ) and ln(U t )~N(−0.5σ u 2 , σ u 2 ). Following 
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We use dynamic stochastic programming to solve this optimization problem. There are five state variables: wealth ( ), the total value of the individual's fund accounts ( ), payments from the LIA ( ), permanent income ( ), and time ( ). 21 We also compute individual consumption and welfare gains under alternative scenarios using our modeling approach.
The values of the preference parameters for the six subgroups are selected so that the model generates 401(k) wealth profiles consistent with empirical evidence. Specifically, we calibrate the model to data from the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI 2014) which reported 401(k) account balances for 7.5 million plan participants in five age groups (20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-69) in 2012. To generate 401(k) simulated balances, we first solve the lifecycle model where the agents have no access to longevity income annuities, and we generate 100,000 lifecycles using optimal feedback controls for each of the six subgroups (male/female with <HS, HS, and Coll+ education). We then aggregate the subgroups to obtain national median values using weights from the National Center on Education Statistics (2012). 22 Finally, to compare our results to the EBRI (2014) data, we construct average account levels for each of the five age subgroups. We repeat this procedure for several sets of preference parameters. We find that a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 5 and a time discount rate β of 0.96 are the parameters that closely match simulated model outcomes to empirical evidence on 401(k) balances. 23 Figure 2 displays simulated and empirical data for the five age groups, and it shows that our simulated outcomes are remarkably close to the empirically-observed 401(k) account values.
Figure 2

Results and discussion of the baseline case
In this section, we describe the average optimal life cycle patterns for labor income, consumption, assets held inside and outside tax-qualified retirement plans, and income generated from 401(k) plans based on simulated data for the US population having access to 401(k) plans. As described above, for each of the six subgroups (male/female by three educational levels), we use optimal feedback controls of our lifecycle model to generate (Poterba et al. 2000) .
On retiring, the individual boosts his plan withdrawals substantially to compensate for the fact that his Social Security income is far below his pre-retirement labor income. The gray line represents the average amount of financial assets (stocks and bonds) held outside the taxqualified retirement plan. These are held mainly as precautionary saving to buffer uninsurable labor income risk during the work life, and to cover out-of-pocket medical expenses in retirement.
Figure 3
Panel B of Figure 3 Thereafter, the LIA pays an annual benefit of $7,050 (worth 39.3% of the Social Security benefit) for the rest of his life. During the work life, the average amount of assets held outside the tax-qualified retirement plans is the same as without having access to the LIA, but in retirement, precautionary savings are lower. Also of interest is the fact that the individual having access to the LIA consumes more, in expectation, compared to when he lacks access, particularly after age 85. This is because the individual is insured against running out of money in old age. Figure 4 displays the difference in consumption with and without access to the LIA. The
x-axis represents the individual's age, and the y-axis the consumption difference (in $000). We depict these in percentiles (95%; 5%) using a fan chart, where differences are measured for each of the 100,000 simulation paths. Darker areas represent higher probability masses, and the solid line represents the expectation. Results show that, prior to age 85, consumption differences are small: the median difference is only $2 at age 50. But by age 85, the retiree with the LIA can consume about $1,000 more per year on average, and $2,500 more by age 95. There is also heterogeneity in the outcomes, such that at age 50, the difference is only -$2 for the bottom quarter of the sample, while it is $8 for the 75 th percentile. The heterogeneity in outcomes increases substantially after age 65: for instance, at age 95, the difference is $1,000 for the 25 th percentile, but $5,700 for the 75 th quantile.
Figure 4 here
Overall, we conclude that the opportunity to purchase a longevity income annuity provides individuals with the potential to save less yet consume substantially more, particularly at older ages.
Other Comparisons
In this section, we report results for other educational groups by sex. In addition, we explore the sensitivity of our results to different mortality assumptions, add a bequest motive, and evaluate what happens if the LIA has an earlier start age.
Differences by Sex and Educational Attainment. Taking into account alternative mortality assumptions is interesting for two reasons.
First, recent studies report widening mortality differentials by education, raising questions about whether the least-educated will benefit much from longevity annuities. For instance, Kreuger et al. (2015) report that male high school dropouts average 23% excess mortality and females 32%, compared to high school graduates. By contrast, those with a college degree live longer: men average a 6% lower mortality rate, and women 8%. Though only 10% of Americans have less than a high school degree (Ryan and Bauman 2016) and they comprise only 8% of the over-age 25 workforce (US DOL 2016), this group is more likely to be poor.
Second, employer-provided retirement accounts in the US are required to use unisex life tables to compute 401(k) payouts (Turner and McCarthy 2013) . While men's lower survival rates may make LIAs less attractive to men than to women, it has not yet been determined how men's welfare gains from accessing LIA products relate to women's. Accordingly, in what follows, we present results for those persons anticipating shorter lifespans. Table 2 presents results for each of these alternative scenarios. In Column 1, we report the impact of having the LIA priced using a unisex mortality table, as would be true in the US company retirement plan context. Columns 2 and 3 show results when annuities for high school dropouts of both sexes are priced using higher mortality (as in Kreuger et al. 2015) . In Column 4 reports the impact of assuming a shorter deferral period: that is, here, the LIA begins paying out at age 80 instead of age 85. The last column depicts outcomes for females (Coll+) with a bequest motive. Bernheim (1991) and, more recently, Inkmann and Michaelides (2012) , have suggested that US and UK households' life insurance demand is compatible with a bequest motive, and Bernheim et al. (1985) report that many older persons indicate that they desire to leave bequests. Nevertheless, evidence regarding the strength of the bequest motive is mixed. Hurd (1989) estimates an almost-zero intentional bequest preference and concludes that, in the US at least, most households leave only accidental bequests.
the existence of a bequest motive produces higher savings in retirement accounts at advanced ages, but it has little impact on the demand for LIAs.
Welfare Analysis
We next discuss the welfare gains when people have access to longevity income annuities by comparing two workers, both age 66. Each behaves optimally before and after retirement, but the first has the opportunity to buy LIAs at age 65, while the second does not.
Since people are risk averse, it is not surprising that the utility level of those having access to LIAs at age 66 is generally higher than those without. We also compute the additional 401(k) wealth needed to compensate those lacking LIAs, to make them as well off as those having the products. Formally, we find the additional asset ( ) that would need to be deposited in the 401(k) accounts of individuals lacking access to LIA, so their utility would be equivalent to that with access to the LIA product. This is defined as follows: of her 401(k) account to the deferred lifetime income annuity. If unisex mortality tables were required (second row), the optimal fraction of her account devoted to the LIA would change only trivially, and the welfare gain is actually higher due to the fact that, on average, women benefit from the use of unisex tables. If the LIA product initiated payouts from age 80 instead of age 85 (third row), more retirement money would be devoted to this product (26.7% of the account value) and the woman's welfare gain would amount to 17% ($15,802) . Table 3 here
The next few rows of the table report results for different educational groups by sex.
Among women, we see that welfare is enhanced by having access to the LIA product, though the gain of $6,280 for the HS graduates still exceeds that for HS dropouts (regardless of whether population or higher mortality rates are used). For men, we see that the gain for the Coll+ group is substantial when LIAs are available, on the order of $35,837 as of age 66. Smaller results obtain for the less-educated, though even HS dropouts with the lower survival probabilities still benefit more than women, on average. Gains are still positive, though small, if the leasteducated group has higher mortality as shown.
In sum, in our framework, both women and men benefit from access to longevity income annuities. While workers anticipating lower lifetime earnings and lower longevity do benefit proportionately less than the Coll+ group, all subsets examined gain from having access to the LIA when they can optimally allocate their retirement assets to these accounts.
How Might a Default Solution for the Longevity Annuity Work?
Thus far, our findings imply that a majority of 401(k) plan participants would benefit from having access to a longevity income annuity based on the new RMD rules implemented by the Treasury in 2014. Nevertheless, some people might still be unwilling or unable to commit to an LIA even if it were sensibly priced (as here). 26 For this reason, a plan sponsor could potentially implement a payout default, wherein a portion of the retiring workers' retirement plan assets would be used at age 65 to automatically purchase deferred lifetime payouts. Such a default would accomplish the goal of "putting the pension back" into the retirement plan.
One policy option along these lines would be for an employer to default a fixed fraction of retirees' 401(k) accountssay 10%into a LIA when they turn age 65. This fixed fraction approach is compatible in spirit with the optimal default rates depicted in For the base case Coll+ female, we see that her welfare gain from the fixed fraction default comes to $12,810, just slightly ($310) lower than the gain in the fully optimal case in Table 3 . She still benefits under the fixed fraction approach when a unisex mortality table is used, but it provides 12% lower welfare gain than in the full optimality case (or $1,827 less than the $15,384 amount in Table 3 ). Welfare gains for the fixed fraction + threshold approach are comparable for the Coll+ woman. Accordingly, older educated women would likely favor LIAs beginning at age 85, under both the fixed fraction and the fixed fraction + threshold approaches.
Turning to the less-educated women, it is not surprising to learn that welfare gains are smaller for both default options. For instance, requiring the less-educated to annuitize a fixed fraction (10%) of their 401(k) wealth reduces utility for the HS graduates using sex-specific mortality tables by 13% (i.e., from $6,280 to $5,467), and by more, 41.5%, for HS dropouts 27 This appears to be a reasonable threshold in that workers in their 60's with at least five years on the job averaged $68,800 or more in their 401(k) plans, as of 2014 (Vanderhei et al. 2016) . The same source found that workers in their 60s who earned $40-$60,000 per year averaged $96,400 in their 401(k) accounts; those earning $60-$80,000 per year averaged %$151,800; and those earning $80-$100,000 held an average of $223,640 in these retirement accounts.
(i.e., from $2,204 to $1287). If mortality rates for HS dropouts were 34% higher, as noted above, these least-educated women would actually be worse off under the fixed fraction approach. For such individuals, the fixed fraction + threshold would be more appealing, as those with very low incomes and low savings would be exempted from buying LIAs. In fact, HS graduates do just about as well under this second policy option as in the optimum.
Regarding results for men, we see that the default 10% LIA has little negative impact on their welfare. This is primarily due to their higher lifetime earnings, allowing them to save more, as well as lower survival rates. For instance, the Coll+ male's welfare gain in the optimum is $35,837 (Table 3) and just slightly less, $33,032, under the fixed fraction option.
The fixed fraction + threshold default is likewise not very consequential for the best-educated male, with welfare declining only 8% compared to the optimum. Less-educated males experience only slightly smaller welfare gains with both default policies; indeed, if they are permitted to avoid annuitization when they have less than $65,000 in their retirement accounts, benefits are quite close to the optimum welfare levels across the board.
Finally, we repeat our welfare analysis for the default solutions assuming that the LIAs are priced using a unisex instead of a sex-specific mortality table. If a retiree retains his tax qualified retirement assets with his former company during the decumulation phase, the annuity must be priced using a unisex table. Alternatively, a retiree can transfer his 401(k) plan assets to an individual retirement account (IRA) offered by a private-sector financial institution, which is allowed to use sex-specific mortality tables to price annuities offered outside the plan. Table   5 depicts results for the various subgroups when LIA's are priced using a unisex table. For men (women), not surprisingly, the welfare gains of such the default solutions decreases (increases) compared to the situation with sex-specific annuity pricing (see Table 4 ). Yet the welfare gain is still remarkably high for workers having Coll+ and High School education. Even for female high school dropouts, the simple default solution based on a 10%-fixed percentage rule produces a small welfare cost ($ -465) (assuming mortality rate 34% above average). The fixed-percentage rule plus an asset threshold of $ 65,000 overcomes this problem since the welfare gains are again positive ($558). Overall, introducing the asset threshold generally yields welfare gains compared to the situation without the asset threshold. In sum, this section has shown that requiring workers to devote a fixed fraction of their 401(k) accounts to longevity income annuities starting at age 85, and additionally, limiting the requirement to savers having at least $65,000 in their retirement accounts, does not place undue hardships on older men or women across the board. Moreover, this approach offers a way for retirees to enhance their lifetime consumption, protect against running out of money in old age, and enjoy greater utility levels than without the LIAs.
Conclusion and Implications
We have examined the potential impact of a recent effort to "put the pension back" into defined contribution plans. This is a concern to the extent that financially-inexperienced consumers may do a poor job handling investment and longevity risk in their self-directed retirement accounts. 28
This important change in Treasury regulations has dramatically reversed a deep-seated institutional bias against including annuities in US private-sector pensions, by permitting retirees to purchase a deferred lifetime income annuity using a portion of their plan assets without negative tax consequences. 29 We show that this development can reverse the traditional reluctance to annuitize in the context of a realistic and richly-specified life cycle model which takes into account stochastic capital market returns, labor income streams, and mortality, as well as taxes, Social Security benefits, and RMD rules for 401(k) plans. We show that both women and men benefit in expectation from the LIAs, and even lower-paid and less-educated individuals stand to gain from this innovation. Moreover, we conclude that plan sponsors wishing to integrate a deferred lifetime annuity as a default in their plans can do so to a meaningful extent by converting as little as 10% of retiree plan assets, and particularly if the default is implemented for workers having plan assets over a reasonable threshold.
Financial institutions, insurance companies, and mutual fund companies are increasingly focused on helping Baby Boomers build retirement security, so this research should interest those seeking to guide this generation as it determines how to manage 401(k) plan assets into retirement. Similar recommendations are likewise relevant to the management of Individual Retirement Accounts as these too are subject to the RMD rules and relevant tax considerations described above. Additionally, regulators concerned with enhancing retirement security will find useful the default LIA mechanism described here, to help protect retirees from running out of money in old age. Certainly not least, our results confirm that those seeking to explain household saving and portfolio allocation patterns can benefit by incorporating influential and highly important institutional features of the financial environment into their models. ; retirement age 66; risk-free interest rate 1%; mean stock return 5%; and stock return volatility 18%. For parameters for labor income profiles see Table A1 . Values for the full population are generated using education subgroups fractions from the National Center on Education Statistics (2012); see text. Empirical account balance data are taken from the Employee Benefit Research Institute (2014); age groups referred to as 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, and 60s denote average values for persons age 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-69 Table A1 ); retirement age 66; Social Security benefits are computed as described in the text with bend points as of 2013; LIA refers to annuitized 401(k) assets paying lifelong annuity benefits from age 85 on; minimum required withdrawals from 401(k)plans are based on life expectancy using the IRS-Uniform Lifetime Table 2013 ; for taxes, 401(k) plans available in tax-qualified account, taxation as described in Appendix B; risk-free interest rate 1%; mean stock return 5%; stock return volatility 18%. Source: Authors' calculations. 
Appendix A: Wage rate estimation
We calibrated the wage rate process using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1975-2013 from age 25 to 69. During the work life, the individual's labor income profile has deterministic, permanent, and transitory components. The shocks are uncorrelated and normally distributed according to ( )~(−0.5 2 , 2 ) and ( )~(−0.5 2 , 2 ). The wage rate values are expressed in $2013. These are estimated separately by sex and by educational level.
The educational groupings are: less than High School (<HS), High School graduate (HS), and those with at least some college (Coll+). Extreme observations below $5 per hour and above the 99 th percentile are dropped.
We use a second order polynomial in age and dummies for employment status. The regression function is:
where log ( , ) is the natural log of wage at time y for individual i, age is the age of the individual divided by 100, ES is the employment status of the individual, and wave dummies control for year-specific shocks. For employment status we include three groups depending on work hours per week as follows: part-time worker (≤ 20 hours), full-time worker (< 20 & ≤ 40 hours) and over-time worker (< 40 hours). OLS regression results for the wage rate process equations appear in Table A1 .
To estimate the variances of the permanent and transitory components, we follow Carroll and Samwick (1997) and Hubener at al. (2016) . We calculate the difference of the observed log wage and our regression results, and we take the difference of these differences across different lengths of time d. For individual i, the residual is:
We then regress the = , 2 ̅̅̅̅̅ on the lengths of time d between waves and a constant:
where the variance of the permanent factor 2 = 1 and the 2 = 2 represents the variance of the transitory shocks. Age/100 3.146*** 6.098*** 9.117*** 1.253*** 2.820*** 4.646*** (0.108) (0.050) (0.073) (0.109) (0.047) (0.075) Age²/10000 -3.314*** -6.581*** -9.388*** -1.326*** -2.997*** -4.886*** (0.130) (0.063) (0.093) (0.131) (0.061) (0.097)
Part-time work -0.110*** -0.159*** -0.086*** -0.088*** -0.127*** -0.088*** (0.02) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) Over-time work 0.004 0.049*** 0.095*** 0.017*** 0.075*** 0.106*** (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0. 
Appendix B: 401(k) plans tax-qualified pension account
We integrate a US-type progressive tax system into our model to explore the impact of having access to a qualified (tax-sheltered) pension account of the EET type. 30 Here the worker must pay taxes on labor income and on capital gains from investments in bonds and stocks.
During the working life, he invests in the tax-qualified pension account, which reduces taxable income up to an annual maximum amount =$18,000. Correspondingly, withdrawals from the tax-qualified account increase taxable income. Finally, the worker's taxable 30 That is, contributions and investment earnings in the account are tax exempt (E), while payouts are taxed (T).
income is reduced by a general standardized deduction . For a single person, this deduction amounted to $5,950 per year. Consequently, taxable income in working age is given by: +1 = max[max( ⋅ ( +1 − 1) + ⋅ ( − 1); 0) + +1 (1 − ℎ ) + − min( ; ) −
; 0]
For Social Security ( +1 ) taxation up to age 66, we use the following rules: when combined income 31 is between $25,000 and $34,000 (over $34,000), 50% (85%) of benefits are taxed. 32
In line with US rules for federal income taxes, our progressive tax system has six income tax brackets (IRS 2012a). 
where, for ⊆ , the indicator function 1 → {0, 1} is defined as:
In line with US regulation, the individual must pay an additional penalty tax of 10% on early withdrawals prior to age 59 ½ ( = 36): +1 ( +1 ) = { +1 ( +1 ) ≥ 36 +1 ( +1 ) + 0.1 < 36 .
(B4) 31 Combined income is sum of adjusted gross income, nontaxable interest, and half of his Social Security benefits. 32 See https://www.ssa.gov/planners/taxes.html 33 Here we assume that capital gains are taxed at the same rate as labor income, so we abstract from the possibility that long-term investments may be taxed at a lower rate.
